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Abstract—Most modern smartphones are equipped with a
barometer to sample air pressure. Accessing these samples is
deemed harmless, hence does not require any permission. In this
work, we show, however, that these samples can reveal sensitive
information in smartphones with ingress protection. For the first
time, it is shown that barometer samples, even at a low rate of 25
Hz, can leak information about the smartphone’s speaker activity.
Specifically, we use these samples to detect with high accuracy
(≥ 95%) whether the smartphone’s speaker is silent or playing
a sound such as a ringtone. In addition, we use the samples to
detect the activity of an external speaker. Finally, we show that
low-rate barometer samples can be used to 1) detect touchscreen
finger taps with 100% accuracy, and 2) gain information about
the positions of finger taps.
Index Terms—Smartphone, barometer, side-channel inference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have become an integral part of our daily
lives. We have been increasingly relying on them for various
tasks including communications, navigation, fitness tracking,
gaming, social networking and banking. To support this wide
set of tasks, smartphones have been equipped with many
sensors ranging from microphones and cameras to GPS, ac-
celerometers, gyroscopes and barometers.
The abundance and sensitivity of data collected by sensors
in smartphones is a major privacy concern. To address this
concern, smartphones have put in place permission mecha-
nisms that allow users to control apps’ access to many of
the these sensors. In Android, for example, apps must get
permissions from users either at install time or at run time to
access sensitive sensors. In addition, access to sensitive sensors
may be taken away when the app goes to the background.
For instance, an app in the background does not get access
to the touchscreen input, as the input may contain sensitive
information such as passwords or texts that belong only to the
foreground app.
There are sensors whose access requires no permission or
user notification, because their data is deemed to be safe. One
such sensor is barometer, which is now found in most mid-
range to high-range smartphones. In addition to measuring air
pressure, barometers can be used as altimeters since pressure
data can be translated to altitude. Sensitivity of barometer
samples makes it possible to detect altitude changes as little
as one meter. Because of this sensitivity, many apps including
floor level detection in indoor tracking rely on barometer
sensors. Barometers can also be used in low-power outdoor
tracking as they consume significantly lower power than GPS.
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In this work, we investigate whether barometer can be
used as a side channel to gain sensitive information. A major
challenge in doing so is the low sampling rate of smartphone’s
barometers, currently limited to 25Hz [1]. Despite this limi-
tation, we show two possible side channel information leaks
in smartphones with ingress protection. First, we show for
the first time that barometer samples reveal information about
the smartphone’s speaker activity, as well as the activity of
an external speaker. Second, we show that the samples leak
information about the occurrence of a finger tap (a gentle touch
on the screen with a finger), and their positions.
Paper Organization. The remainder of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. A review of related work is presented
in Section II. A background is provided in Section III. We
discuss our initial observations in Section IV, and present
our experimental methodology and results in Section V. We
discuss some defense solutions in Section VIII. Finally, we
conclude and present future research directions in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Barometric air pressure measurements by smartphones’
barometers can be used to estimate altitude, and detect altitude
changes of as little as one meter [2]. Because of this, barom-
eters on smartphones have been used in many apps such as
aiding GPS [3], detecting floor level for indoor positioning [4],
and improving calorie estimation in fitness apps [2].
Smartphone barometers have not been explicitly used in
the literature for side channel attacks. However, existing work
suggest that barometer’s measurements leak information about
users’ activities and surroundings. Sankaran et al. [2] showed
that barometer data can be used to detect user’s activities
IDLE, WALKING, and in VEHICLE. Ho et al. [5] exploited
barometer data to infer driving routes. And, sudden changes
in barometric data was utilized by Wu et al. [6] to detect the
buildings’ door opening/closing events.
In a recent work, Quinn [7] proposed to use barometers to
estimate touch forces in an attempt to provide force sensing
functionality in smartphones that lack an integrated force-
sensing hardware. To this end, Quinn showed that barometers
on smartphones with ingress protection can estimate robotic
forces on their touchscreen. One of the main contributions of
our work is to show that barometers on such devices are able
to detect even gentle finger taps, and to some extent their po-
sitions. We further show that barometers on smartphones with
ingress protection can reveal information about the phone’s
earpiece speaker. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
prior work that studies the feasibility of detecting speaker
activities, or detecting sounds in general, using smartphone’s
barometers.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
03
87
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 A
ug
 20
20
2III. BACKGROUND
A. Ingress protection
Many smartphones are now sealed and nearly air-tight to
protect the device’s internal components from the ingress of
dust and liquid. The degree of protection offered by a device is
typically indicated by an IP (Ingress Protection) code from IEC
standard 60529. An IP rate typically has two digits [8]. The
first digit refers to the ingress protection against solids. This
scale goes from 0 to 6, where 0 indicates no protection, and 6
indicates dust-tight. The second digit indicates the protection
level against water. The digit ranges from 0 to 9, where a
higher value correspond with more protection. Most of the
mid to high-end smartphones, including the smartphone used
in our experiments, are either IP68 or IP67 certified. These
ratings imply that they are dust-tight, and protected against
immersion in water [9].
B. Barometer and barometric vents
A barometer, also known as air-pressure sensor, is now
found in most mid-range to high-end smartphones (e.g. iPhone
6/7/8/X, Samsung note 6/7/8, Google Pixel 2). It can act as
an altimeter and provide a rough altitude to improve 1) GPS
accuracy in vertical direction [10]; 2) indoor navigation by
revealing floor changes [11]; and 3) accuracy in apps such as
fitness apps [2].
In devices with ingress protection, barometric vents are
added to allow an internal barometer to measure outside
atmospheric pressure. This also protects the device’s seals and
internal components from the stress that can be placed by the
difference in air pressure inside and outside the device. The
barometric vents are hydrophobic membrane, and are struc-
tured to prevent penetration of dust particle while allowing
the flow of air to equalize internal and external barometric
pressures. The air pressure equalization is, however, slow and
occurs over a short period of time. This makes it possible to
capture sudden changes to the internal pressure using low-rate
barometric samples provided by the barometer.
Figure 1 shows the placement of the barometer sensor
inside our testing smartphone, Samsung Galaxy S10 Plus. The
barometer is an ultra-compact LPS22HH pressure sensor by
STMicroelectronics. According to the LPS22HH datasheet, the
sensor is capable of sampling air pressure at 200 Hz [12].
However, the Android Application Programming Interface
(API) limits the rate to 25 Hz [1]. In this work, we access
the barometer samples at the rate of 25 Hz.
C. Earpiece Speaker
Figure 2 shows the Samsung Galaxy S10 Plus earpiece
speaker. Vent holes on both sides of the speaker allow air to
get in and out of the speaker when it plays a sound. Both the
earpiece speaker and the barometer are inside the smartphone.
Therefore, it is natural to ask if the barometer would capture
the speaker’s activity, as sound is a pressure wave.
Fig. 1. Samsung Galaxy S10 Plus barometer sensor (highlighted).
Fig. 2. The Samsung Galaxy S10 Plus earpiece speaker with vent holes on
both sides to allow air to get in and out.
IV. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
In devices with ingress protection, the internal pressure
equalizes with the external pressure over a short period of
time. This makes it possible to capture changes in the internal
pressure using low-rate samples from the device’s barometer.
Figure 3 shows the barometer samples when a 12 Hz
sinusoid tone was played on the device’s earpiece speaker.
Notice that the barometer sample signal roughly follows the
sinusoid signal recorded by the device’s microphone. This
primary observation suggests that it may be possible to detect
earpiece speaker activity using the device’s internal barometer.
Figure 4 shows the impact of a touchscreen finger tap on
the internal pressure of our testing device. A finger tap slightly
flexes the screen inwards, causing the internal volume of the
device to slightly decrease. Since the device is nearly airtight,
the gas inside the device cannot escape immediately through
the vents. Consequently, the gas inside the device is com-
pressed, causing the internal barometric pressure to increase.
Once the user removes the finger from the screen, the screen
returns to its normal position and causes a short vacuum, this
time causing the internal pressure to decrease. This initial
observation suggests that low-rate barometer samples may leak
information about finger taps.
3 
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Microphone
50 100 150 200 250
Time
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Pressure Sensor
Fig. 3. Signals recorded by the device’s barometer and microphone when a
12 Hz sinusoid tone was played on the earpiece speaker.
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Fig. 4. The impact of a finger tap on the internal pressure captured by the
device’s barometer. (1) internal pressure increases as the result of finger tap,
(2) a decrease in the pressure after the finger tap, (3) pressure equalization.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Data collection
We developed two custom Android apps for data collection:
SpeakerSpy and TouchSpy. Using SpeakerSpy, we recorded
barometric pressure samples during earpiece speaker activity
(i.e., when the given sound is played) and inactivity (i.e., when
the speaker is silent). To collect data records, we alternated
between ten seconds of speaker activity, and ten seconds of
inactivity. A two-second “resting period” was added between
consequent periods of speaker activity an inactivity to allow
the internal and external air pressures to equalize. A data
record was labeled active if the barometer samples were taken
during the speaker activity; otherwise, it was labeled inactive.
We collected in total 450 records, half of which were labeled
as active and the other half as inactive.
In a second experiment, we used SpeakerSpy to record
barometer samples during an external bluetooth speaker ac-
tivity. The objective of this experiment was to check whether
the smartphone’s barometer can distinguish the case where
the external speaker is silent from the case where it plays a
sound. The external speaker was placed at distance 15cm from
the smartphone. The sound played by the external speaker was
a 12 Hz sinusoid, and the sound level was 73 dBA. For this
experiment, we collected 270 records.
We used the second app, TouchSpy, to read and record
barometric pressure samples during a screen finger tap. Each
record spans an interval of two seconds, starting one second
prior to the tap. The barometer sampling rate is 25 Hz, thus
each record consists of 50 samples. To collect real data using
TouchSpy, we employed three participants. Each participant
was asked to tap (as they normally do) the touchscreen of
a stationary phone placed on a desk. In one setting, the
participants were asked to tap a randomly selected position on
the screen. In the second setting, the participants were asked
to tap a random number on a custom 3-by-3 pin entry keypad
shown in Figure 5. For each setting, we collected 1116 records
per participant. The records collected in the first setting were
used to train and test a classifier for detecting finger taps, while
the ones collected in the second setting were used to train and
test a classifier for inferring the position of a tap.
 
Fig. 5. Pin entry keypad (numpad) in the TouchSpy app.
Preprocessing. We treated each record as a time series, and
normalized it to reduce/eliminate the impact of the measure-
ment unit, signal power and gradual changes in atmospheric
pressure in the course of data gathering. To this end, we used a
simple normalization called standardizing, in which each data
point x in the time series is replaced by its z-score z = x−x¯S ,
where x¯ and S are the mean and standard deviation of the
time series, respectively.
For the records corresponding to the external speaker experi-
ment, we used a Savitsky-Golay filter of order 2 and frame size
5 to reduce the effect of noise. This additional preprocessing
improved our detection accuracy by 10% (from 82% to 92%).
Classificaiton and performance evaluation. We used a
support-vector machine (SVM1) as our classification method.
To evaluate the performance of SVM, we applied multiple 5-
fold cross validations. In a 5-fold cross validation, the records
1SVM is a popular classification method, which gets a set of n-dimensional
points, and constructs a hyperplane or a set of hyperplanes to separate them.
4are randomly split into five groups of equal size, where each
group has equal number of records from each class. Then, for
every number i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5,
1) the group i is marked as the test set;
2) the remaining four groups are marked as the training set;
3) the SVM classifier is trained using the training set;
4) the accuracy of the trained classifier is measured using
the test set.
At the end of the above iterative process, the average of the
five accuracy scores (obtained in Step 4) is returned as the
accuracy result of the cross validation. In this work, every
reported accuracy result is the average of the results of ten
5-fold cross validations.
B. Accuracy results
Earpiece speaker activity detection. Barometer-based
speaker activity detection (B-SAD) is a binary classification
problem: given a sound and the barometer samples, infer
whether the smartphone’s speaker is playing the sound or is
silent. Note that a malicious app with B-SAD capability can
steal user’s sensitive information. For example, it can set the
sound to, say, the device’s default ringtone to detect when a
phone call is received.
To evaluate the performance of SVM in solving B-SAD, we
used two types of sounds. The first one was a simple sinusoid
tone of 12 Hz (nearly half the barometer’s sampling rate of
25 Hz). For the second sound we used a popular Android
ring tone. In our experiment, the SVM classifier achieved
a detection accuracy of 96% for the 12 Hz sinusoid tone,
and 95% for the default Samsung ringtone2. For the case
of external speaker activity, SVM achieved an accuracy of
92%. We remark that these are the first feasibility results
showing that barometer samples can leak information about
both internal and external speaker activity.
Our testing smartphone is IP68 rated (i.e., a good level of
ingress protection), which makes it possible to detect speaker’s
activity using low-rate barometer samples. We remark that
barometer samples may leak information about the speaker’s
activity in non-IP rated smartphones, too. To show this, we
repeated the above experiment with Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge,
which is a non-IP rated smartphone. In this experiment, SVM
achieved a detection accuracy of 67%. This accuracy is non-
negligible, although it is significantly lower than the 95%
accuracy we achieved in the IP68-rated smartphone.
Detecting taps. Quinn [7] recently showed that, in devices
with ingress protection, forces on touchscreen can be detected
using the device’s internal barometer. To this end, a robotic
arm was programmed to perform five second touch contacts
with three different force levels (1, 3, and 5N). In our work,
however, we explore the possibility of detecting finger taps
(rather than robotic arm pressures) and their positions.
Unlike the 5-second robotic arm touch contacts in [7], finger
taps have a short touchscreen contact time. In our experiment,
the touchscreen contact time of a finger tap ranged from 24ms
to 183ms, with the average of 85ms. As stated in [7] if a
2Over-the-horizon ringtone, extracted from Samsung Galaxy S10 Plus.
user’s input force changes too quickly, it may not be captured
by the barometer. In addition, based on the study in [13],
finger taps typically produce less force than those applied in
Quinn’s experiment. Therefore it is not clear if finger taps
are detectable at all. In our experiment, however, the SVM
classifier achieved 100% accuracy in detecting finger taps.
Next we show that barometer samples can reveal information
about the position of taps, too.
Detecting the position of a tap. As mentioned earlier,
we used a custom numpad to collect finger tap records. This
numpad (Figure 5) uses exclusively the lower half of the
screen, as this is the default location of touch keyboards
and numpads on most smartphones. The numpad divides the
lower half of the screen into nine different regions/keys. Each
region/key has different degrees of freedom. The difference in
degrees of freedom leads to different amounts of screen flex
and recovery as the result of a tap. This makes it possible
to profile each region/key, and guess the number which was
tapped.
Our accuracy results are summarized in Figure 6. The
number in row i and column j of the table is the probability
the the classifier outputs i when the actual number tapped
was j. For instance, when user presses 5 our SVM classifier
outputs 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 with probabilities 24%, 8%, 41%, 17%
and 10%, respectively. As shown in Figure 6, probabilities of
correct identification (i.e., numbers on the main diagonal of the
table) range from 18% to 69% with the average of 41%. One
may compare this to the probability of correct identification
in random guess, which is about 11%.
 
# #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 
#1 18   4   27 31 16 
#2  42 45  24 6    
#3  39 40  8 6    
#4 10   69  13 4 2  
#5  11 15 7 41 25    
#6 3 8  16 17 50    
#7 28      33 27 9 
#8 31   4 10  26 19 18 
#9 10      10 21 57 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. The number in row i and column j of the table is the probability that
the classifier returns i when the actual number tapped was j.
VI. AN ATTACK SCENARIO
Traditional side-channel attacks such as [14] require the
adversary to have physical access to the device, or be in the
close vicinity of the device. The trend has, however, shifted
for smartphones. Using the results presented in this work, an
adversary can execute a barometer-based side-channel attack
5entirely remotely. To do so, the adversary needs to take
the following steps to execute a successful touchscreen tap
inference or B-SAD on a phone.
1) Embed a malicious code into an app . An adversary
has at least two options to access the barometer’s API.
The first option is to build a new app (e.g., a weather
forecast app) from scratch, and embed the malicious
code (which gathers barometer samples, and performs
inference) inside it. The second option is to inject the
malicious code into a popular and well-known app such
as a popular game. There are pros and cons to each
method. Making an app from scratch gives the attacker
the ability to publish the malicious app silently via, say,
the Google Play Store. Also, it gives the attacker the
chance to request some permissions (like Internet access)
that may initially look legitimate. Such accesses can be
beneficial. For example, the Internet access can be used
to transfer the inferred user’s information to the attacker.
By injecting the malicious code into a well-known and
popular app, on the other hand, the attacker may hit a
larger population. This option, however, does not allow
the attacker to put the modified app on a trusted source
like Google Play Store. This makes it harder for the app
to find its way to the users’ phones.
2) Perform data gathering and training. Data gathering
does not require any permissions from the user, but needs
the user to interact with the malicious app. With an
invisible overlay layout on top of the malicious app, the
app can gather the necessary data for training a model for
the user’s typing habits (the exact force of user’s finger
taps) and phone screen size. In our tests, about 50 samples
per region (key) was the minimum for our classification to
be viable. As for B-SAD, embedded sound queues in the
malicious app are enough to train the model. In our tests,
to perform an accurate B-SAD, a minimum of 25 samples
of each state (active/silence) is necessary. An adversary
can use the gathered data to train an SVM classifier either
locally at the victims’ smartphones, or remotely at their
own end.
3) Perform inference and extraction. At this point, the
malicious app continuously logs the barometer samples
in the background. At the same time, it feeds the col-
lected samples to its SVM classifier to detect taps and/or
earpiece speaker activity. The results of these detections
can be stored locally, or sent to the adversary over the
Internet.
A. Limitations
Our results confirm the possibility of detecting earpiece
speaker activity and touchscreen taps using low-rate baro-
metric air pressure samples. These results rely on relative
pressure rather than absolute pressure values of the barometer;
thus they are applicable to different locations/altitude levels,
and weather conditions. However, there are certain limitations
in detecting speaker activity and finger taps using low-rate
barometer samples. First, the device must have some level of
ingress protection. It is because, otherwise, changes in internal
pressure (due to, for example, finger taps) would quickly
equalize the external atmosphere.
The second major limitation is related to the low sampling
rate of the barometer sensor. The STMicro LPS22HH sensor
datasheet shows that the sensor is capable of sampling at 200
Hz. However, the Android sensor API limits the barometer
sample rate to 25 Hz3 [1]. In our experiments, the low
sampling rate of 25 Hz was not deterrent in detecting earpiece
speaker activity and detecting finger touch contacts. There
are, however, certain tasks that are impossible to perform at
low sampling rates. For instance, by the Nyquist–Shannon
sampling theorem, it is impossible to reconstruct the speaker’s
sound signal fully if the signal has frequencies higher than half
the sampling rate of the barometer.
The low sampling rate of barometer can be preventive in
carrying certain tasks related to screen touch detection as
well. For example, in our experiment, we need to get at least
three sample points in our signal to register a finger tap, and
then wait for at least two sampling cycles for the internal
and external air pressures to equalize. At the sampling rate of
25 Hz, these five sampling cycles translate to a total of 200
milliseconds, which would limit the continuous detection of
finger taps to five taps per second.
Finally, the flow rate of the barometric vent can also become
a limiting factor. As stated in [7], if a user’s input force
changes either too quickly or too slowly, it may not be captured
by the barometer.
VII. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
Reading barometric pressure low-rate samples is considered
harmless. Therefore, modern mobile platforms like Android
allow apps to access the device’s barometer sensor without
user’s permission or notification. Consequently, a malicious
app can readily bypass the user’s permission and attention.
In addition, as shown in [15], sensor-based side-channel at-
tacks can bypass strong separation mechanisms like Samsung
KNOX, which try to provide a secure environment to protect
corporate data on smartphones.
Finally, due to barometer’s low power usage, accessing
the barometric pressure samples may not be detected as, for
example, a power virus. We ran a background service that
continuously reads barometric pressure samples for over 40
hours. This service was not detected as a suspicious activity
by McAfee, Avast, AVG, Bitdefender and Norton antivirus.
VIII. DEFENSES
A first line of defense is to use the device’s permission
system to ask users for permission to access the device’s
barometer. This gives users the chance to deny permission
to apps whose motivation behind requesting the access is
not clear. For instance, users can deny barometer access to
a “flashlight app” as such access is clearly outside the scope
of the app’s functionality.
Another defense is to use third party apps such as App-
Guard [16] that enforce security policies. These apps can pause
3The sampling rate of 25 Hz is provided by the SensorManager.SENSOR
DELAY FASTEST in Android SDK.
6sensor readings (or even kill) background processes/services
when an app with sensitive input (e.g. a banking app) is
running. In addition, malware-analysis apps such as [17]
and [18] can be extended and used to check for malicious
sensor accesses.
Finally, sensitive apps can implement their own custom
security solution. For example, a PIN pad can rearrange its
buttons prior to every sensitive input [19].
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Speaker and touchscreen input contain sensitive informa-
tion. Because of this, touchscreen input is only given to the
foreground app, and microphone’s access (which reveals the
speaker activity) requires user permission. On the other hand,
any app can access the barometer samples without any permis-
sion or notification. This is alarming as our results indicate that
low-rate barometric pressure samples reveal information about
earpiece speaker activity. In addition, the pressure samples leak
information about finger taps, and their positions.
Our work is a first feasibility study, and there are many
ways to extend and improve our results. First, we only used
SVM as our classifying method. More advanced classifiers
and techniques can improve our reported accuracy results.
In addition, barometric pressure samples may be combined
with data samples from other sensors such as ambient-light or
motion sensors to improve accuracy.
In detecting finger taps and their positions, we used a small
number of participants to collect data. Further study is needed
to show if similar results are observed with more number of
participants with, say, various tapping habits. Also, we used a
single type of smartphone in our experiments. We, however,
expect similar results to be observed in many other types of
smartphones with ingress protection.
With regards to earpiece speaker activity, it is interesting to
see how many different classes of activities we can distinguish
using low-rate barometric pressure samples. Our initial obser-
vations, not reported to this work, indicates that it is possible
to distinguish different sounds.
Finally, it is interesting to see how far we can go in detecting
external sounds using low-rate barometer samples.
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